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‘We kind of try to merge our own experience with the objectivity of the criteria’: 
The role of connoisseurship and tacit practice in undergraduate fine art assessment  
 
 
Draft copy submitted prior to publication  
 
 
Professor Susan Orr 
 
Abstract 
This article explores connoisseurship in the context of fine art undergraduate assessment 
practice. I interviewed twelve fine art lecturers in order to explore and unpack the 
concept of connoisseurship in relation to subjectivity, objectivity and tacit practice. 
Building on the work of Bourdieu (1973, 1977, 1986) and Shay (2003, 2005), both of 
whom problematize the view that subjectivity and objectivity are binary opposites, my 
research illustrates the ways that connoisseurship is underpinned by informed 
professional judgements located in communities of practice. Within this particular 
conception of connoisseurship, the lecturers’ expertise is co-constituted in communities 
of assessors through participation and engagement. Standards reside in communities of 
practice.   
 
 
Connoisseurship  
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In common parlance, a connoisseur is someone who has built up extensive knowledge 
about something that enables his or her to make expert judgements. The term is often 
associated with elitism. Arguably, the perceived link between connoisseurship and elitism 
is strengthened by the tendency for the idea of connoisseurship to be associated with the 
consumption of expensive wines or other elite products that are of limited availability. In 
recent years it has become unfashionable to view higher education (HE) assessment as a 
form of connoisseurship. There are several reasons for this. In HE assessment contexts, 
the term ‘connoisseurship’ is often conflated with elitism and mystery. For example, from 
an outcomes-based assessment perspective, connoisseurship has become associated with 
not making the rules clear to students (Ecclestone 1999). If one views the aim of 
assessment as ‘making things clear’, then the idea of connoisseurship is problematic 
because this concept rests on the idea that total clarity is an impossible objective (Orr and 
Blythman 2005). Connoisseurship can appear to clash with the aims of a widening 
participation agenda that seeks to make explicit the practices of HE to new student 
groups. In addition, the idea of connoisseurship has been problematized because, within 
massified HE, there is the view that one can no longer rely on prolonged contact between 
students and lecturers to allow for the transmission of assessment information 
(O’Donovan et al. 2002). As a result, in recent years there has been a move away from 
associating assessment with connoisseurship.  
 
   In this study I seek to explore the extent to which connoisseurship might be a useful 
way to understand fine art assessment practice. In doing so I am attempting to separate 
the association between connoisseurship and elitism in order to find out whether 
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connoisseurship offers a useful framing for academic judgement in fine art.   My key 
research question is this: Can fine art assessment be based in connoisseurship and still be 
rigorous? 
 
Literature overview 
   This study builds on the assessment research of Sambell and McDowell (1998), Hawe 
(2002), Wyatt-Smith (1999), Orrell (2003), Shay (2003, 2004, 2005) and Yorke et al. 
(2000). Collectively, their research offers a textured rendering of tacit practice, hidden 
criteria and personalized assessment practices. Morgan and Wyatt-Smith (2000: 130) 
suggest that the experience of carrying out assessment with other colleagues over time 
enables lecturers to build up a ‘rich store of “insider” or specialist knowledge’ that is not 
fully available to public scrutiny. Ecclestone’s (2001: 305) research suggests that, as 
lecturers gain assessment experience, the nature of their judgement-making becomes 
harder to identify because ‘experts become more intuitive and less deliberative, and are 
less able to articulate the tacit knowledge on which much of their decision making has 
come to depend’. Thus, tacit elements of assessment correspond to developing 
assessment expertise and professional experience (O’Donovan et al. 2004). For Morgan 
and Wyatt-Smith (2000: 130), one way to understand this is to view the lecturer as a 
connoisseur who has a tacit understanding of ‘the characteristics of a fine performance’. 
The expertise of a connoisseur does not readily explicate itself in language, which 
suggests that tacit practice and connoisseurship are interlinked concepts.   
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      In Sadler’s words (2005: 192), ‘tacit knowledge refers to the expertise that people 
carry around with them, mostly in their heads’. Tacit practice has been identified as an 
important element of assessment practice (Sambell and McDowell 1998). In a study of 
studio-based dialogic feedback (otherwise known as the Crit), Percy (2004) identified 
that art and design lecturers use very imprecise language and that they often resort to 
gestural language when discussing students’ artwork. The lecturers in Percy’s study 
wrestle with the challenge of trying to ‘name what they know’ (Polanyi 1998). Percy 
argues that an understanding of tacit practice helps to explain the lecturers’ inability to 
explicate their assessment approaches.  
 
      The expertise of the connoisseur is situated in communities of knowers, and as such 
can be understood as a form of guild knowledge (Sadler 1989). Sadler’s use of the term 
‘guild knowledge’ stresses the significance of teachers acquiring their expertise through 
assessing with other teachers over a period of time. Shay (1994: 606 cited in Shay 2005: 
667) uses Godwin’s term ‘professional vision’  instead of the term ‘connoisseur’ and 
quotes Bourdieu’s description (cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 128) of academics 
who have a ‘feel for the game’. Shay (2005) stresses that professional vision is grounded 
in social contexts. 
Theoretical framework  
      Wenger’s research on communities of practice offers a framework with which to 
understand tacit practice.  Wenger uses the term ‘participation’ to stress the experiential 
nature of practice.  In addition, he refers to reification, which at its simplest means 
‘making into a thing’ (Wenger 2004: 58). In Wenger’s (2004: 58) words, ‘we project our 
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meanings into the world and then we perceive them as existing in the world, having a 
reality of their own’. Written assessment regulations, learning outcomes and assessment 
criteria are representative of reification.  
 
   I seek to extend a Wengerian analysis by drawing on Shay’s (2005) study of an 
assessment community of engineering lecturers. Shay applies a Bourdieun analysis to her 
assessment research. For Bourdieu (1977), the subjective is neither random nor 
incidental; it is framed by habitus. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus refers to sets of 
dispositions that generate practices and perceptions that are continually restructured 
through our encounters in the world. In Reay’s words (2004: 435), habitus can be 
‘viewed as a complex internalized core from which everyday experiences emanate’.  For 
Bourdieu, the subjectivity of assessment is not about bias or error; it can be skilful and 
careful; however, it cannot be made explicit. Equally, the objective is mediated through 
the frame of the subjective. In relation to assessment, this means that there is no 
objectivity that exists ‘out there’.   Structure and agency are a duality; they are 
interdependent. When we assess student work we have individual agency, but we are 
constrained and constructed by wider structural factors that relate to the concept of field 
(Bourdieu 1977).  
 
 
Whilst Wenger’s reification and participation are not equivalent to Bourdieu’s concepts 
of structure and agency, what these theoretical approaches share is an interest in 
explaining the ways that meanings are negotiated in the spaces between the person and 
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their environment. Drawing on Bourdieu, Shay takes the view that assessment is a 
‘socially situated interpretive act’ (p. 663).  She observes:  
 
Assessors’ interpretative frameworks are constituted, in part, by the objective 
conditions of the field and of the community of practice. These are objective 
because they are to a large extent independent of the individual assessor […]. At 
the same time these interpretations are constituted by the particular context of the 
assessment event. This is highly subjective terrain; that is, it is significantly 
dependant on the assessor (2005: 669). 
 
Research focus   
Knight challenges us to research assessment in local contexts because ‘we need to know 
about the discursive practices from which performances arose and through which the 
judgements were made’ (Knight 2006: 448). In response to Knight, my research explores 
the discursive assessment practices within the particular disciplinary context of HE fine 
art. I research from the perspective that assessment is an artful social practice, concurring 
with Delandshere’s (2001) view that assessment is concerned with meaning-making in 
social/cultural/political contexts.  
 
My central research question is this:  Can fine art assessment be based in connoisseurship 
and still be rigorous? To investigate this question, I set out to analyse the assessment 
approaches (as represented via interview) adopted by fine art lecturers, with a particular 
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focus on tacit practice and the ways that they understand the terms subjectivity and 
objectivity. 
 
Methods and analysis 
In Orr (2005: 287), I reviewed a range of methodological approaches that have been 
employed to study HE assessment practice. In this article, I note that interview-based 
studies can elicit ‘an espoused generalist view of assessment’ that may not relate directly 
to actual practice. In subsequent work, I responded to this concern by employing studio-
based observational approaches to explore assessment practice (Orr 2007).   However, 
more recently I have returned to interview-based approaches.   Whilst I am particularly 
aware that there may be a disjuncture between reported approaches and approaches 
employed in the field (see, for example, Orrell 2003), my position is that the reported 
representations are still of value. The purpose of the interviews in this study was not to 
identify how lecturers ‘really assess’.  Lecturers’ accounts of practice may not directly 
reflect practice, but these accounts have a status of their own (Wengraf 2001). As a result, 
I encouraged each interviewee to relate to me examples of specific assessment practices 
(Kvale 1996), because this approach allowed me to access the lecturers’ tacit, cultural 
knowledge (Wengraf 2001). The ‘assumptions and asides in their story telling’ (Wengraf 
2001: 178) enabled me to address my research question. When designing my interview 
questions, I drew on Yorke et al. (2000) study in which lecturers were asked to describe 
how they approached marking student work, how they learnt to assess and what factors 
influenced their decision making. Using semi-structured in-depth interview approaches, I 
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drew on Kvale’s (1996) work on what he calls the InterView to stress the co-constructed 
nature of meaning-making between interviewer and interviewee. 
 
I interviewed twelve experienced
1
 fine art HE lecturers who worked across six English Russell Group and Post-1992 
Universities. This number was selected because I was focusing on depth rather than 
breadth. I made initial contacts with lecturers via university web-based information.  I 
used opportunity sampling techniques to identify the twelve interviewees.   
   
Embracing Wengraf’s (2001) view that analysis is craft-based artistry, my data analysis 
process could be likened to weaving because, through an iterative process, I worked 
through the data set in two directions.   First, I worked across the whole set of transcripts 
building up a coding frame that could be applied to all the interviewees’ transcripts, and 
second  I selected particular transcripts and coded them individually.  In this way I 
worked through the weft and the warp of the data set.  This led to repeated categorization 
and re-categorization. Congruent with my theoretical perspective in relation to 
assessment, my approach to validity is situated within the context of interpretive artful 
practice (Moss 1996). The validity of my research can be assessed by identifying the 
extent to which I have aligned my theoretical approach, research questions, data 
collection and analysis.  
 
Discourses of subjectivity  
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The respondents’ transcripts supported assumptions that their assessment practices would 
be elusive. The extract below appears to illustrate Polanyi’s (1998) view that we cannot 
name all that we know:   
 
You know I think that you can […] you […] you kind of in […] em […] you get 
to know a lot of stuff but you don’t always know that you know it. (BW. Each 
respondent is assigned two initials) 
 
      Throughout the transcripts, there were numerous examples of lecturers trailing off 
mid-sentence or offering sentences that were very ambiguous. I offer an extract from one 
respondent to exemplify this point: 
  
Em, so that’s, you know, I find that quite interesting, so the criteria, I mean you 
know, the criteria for different modules is kind of, em, very specific and we […], 
but we found ourselves using[…], I mean I find it odd ‘cause we just […], we 
have to kind of […], we use the same language in each level but it has to be 
slightly less, less of a […], less of a […], an excellence or something and I find 
sometimes there’s too much repetition in the way we do that. (MP) 
 
The respondents’ sentence fragments illustrate, in a very powerful way that, as Knight 
(2002) suggests, we do not have conscious access to all that we know when we assess 
students’ work. It is at these points in the transcripts (see extracts below) that I am 
offered tantalizing glimpses concerning tacit practice:  
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I was trying to say something[], trying to form something about the work 
having a [] the maker having some sort of genuine relationship to the work, 
can’t quite work out how to say it. (ST)  
 
I remember, you know, just thinking it was all kind of [], almost like a sort of 
implicit knowledge that was going on about why something was valuable or good 
or better than, something better than another thing, em, or better work or art or 
had more coherence or more something or other. (MP) 
  
 These extracts evidence the challenge associated with verbalizing tacit practice. 
Arguably, fine art as a discipline is more tolerant of intuitive approaches (Atkinson and 
Claxton 2000) because the assessment of art is a multi-sensory affair where the eyes 
apprehend the work, but it can also be touched, smelt or listened to. Thus, in fine art, the 
non-verbal is recognized as significant. Atkinson and Claxton (2000: 1) discuss the 
challenges associated with asking teachers to render their intuitive expertise in words, 
and they stress that intuition is not ‘anti-rational or anti-intellectual’. As Brawm (2000) 
usefully reminds us, intuition comes from the word tuition. As such, it is a learnt social 
construct. Learnt tacit practice is linked to the unnamable expertise associated with 
connoisseurship.  
 
Dialogic assessment approaches  
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In fine art, student artwork is commonly assessed and moderated via lecturer discussion 
in situ in the studio (Orr 2007). One possible function of studio-based assessment 
dialogue is identified by Price (2005: 223), who argues that discussion about assessment 
‘facilitate[s] tacit knowledge transfer’. Sadler (2005: 192) develops this view: ‘standards 
based on tacit knowledge commonly exist in unarticulated form but can be shared 
amongst experts […] by joint participation in evaluative activity, including moderation of 
grades’. Several of the respondents in my study commented that tacit approaches become 
more apparent through dialogue: 
 
And maybe your perceptions of where they are in terms of assessing is different to 
other people. Sometimes that comes out in, em, assessments when you’re 
assessing with other staff, sometimes we assess as three staff. (PL, emphasis 
added) 
 
      The respondents suggested that individual subjectivity was mitigated by group 
marking. In the extract below, BW discusses the ways that a single mark emerges from 
the collective views of the group. He suggests that group marking offers a site for 
individual markers to ‘take on’ the group’s views, but as well as this, group marking 
increases his self-awareness about his own ‘take’ on assessment. Marking in a team 
allows for the development of a shared group approach that underpins a community of 
practice.  
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My experience of marking in this department is that those are really useful 
conversations and that people take on board these different viewpoints. Of course, 
we’ve got to somehow come to terms with that we may not agree about it but I 
think we can usually produce a mark from that, that we all think it is a use[], a 
good mark, you know it’s a useable mark (sic), it’s a valid mark for that student. 
(BW, emphasis added) 
 
      Group marking offers a site where meanings are shared, contested and negotiated. In 
this way, community consensus is established. As JR remarks:  
 
When you’re grading, I think that, em, I actually tend to be, em, weirdly kind of 
quite similar to some of my other colleagues. (JR)  
 
      For Bourdieu this would not be so weird. JR’s extract stresses the inter-subjectivity of 
assessment. Thus, JR’s apparently subjective individualized assessment approaches are 
better understood as shared and co-constituted. The concept of inter-subjectivity stresses 
the social nature of subjectivity (Shay 2005). For Bourdieu (1977), the social world is in 
the body in the form of habitus. Thus, elements of the lecturers’ personal aesthetics are 
socially produced. In Shay’s (2005: 675) words, ‘intuitive judgements are internalisations 
of the objective regularities of the field they inhabit’. By analysing the respondents’ 
representations of subjectivity and objectivity, we come to an understanding of the 
process through which lecturers come to make assessment judgements based on a 
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connoisseurship model of knowledge. Thus, one respondent discusses the process by 
which he has, in his words, become an ‘informed subject’:  
 
There’s a difference between the, em, occasional subjective response and what we 
might call a professional subjective response and a professional subjective 
response is, you know, one that assumes and expects a much more informed 
response about what the different territories and critical fields of debate are that 
exist in [], in [], in the specialist school of fine art at the moment [] we 
create a position of being an informed subject. (ST, emphasis added) 
 
      Bourdieu’s conception of subjectivity and objectivity as mutually constitutive and 
interdependent is underlined when LC refers to an ‘objective opinion’.  Opinions are 
usually considered to be in the realm of the subjective. This underlines the limitations of 
a dualistic view of subjectivity and objectivity. If I were to analyse the extracts below 
using a commonsense dualistic view of subjectivity and objectivity, the lecturers’ 
narratives would appear conflicted and contradictory. However, if we use Shay’s (2005) 
analysis, the extracts illustrate the ‘iterative movement between different modes of 
knowledge which comprise the objective and the subjective’ (Shay 2005: 663). In the 
extract below, the lecturer wrestles with this ‘double truth’.  
 
The subjective thing is being made by highly trained, educated kind of specialists 
in that subject, so there is a subjective decision being made, but by specialists. So 
a non-specialist would say “Oh! I like that one […] I don’t like that one”. We 
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would be able to say “Why do you like that one? […] Why don’t you like that 
one?” It would be an informed judgement, both because of our own standard 
practice and our own understanding of the student and so on. [] But there is still 
space for the art kind of feelings, that’s got a role to play. (DR, emphasis added) 
 
      Whilst subjectivity is recognized as central to the lecturers’ response to students’ 
artwork, it was also presented as problematic.  In the extract below, MT stresses that 
subjectivity is viewed by some as ‘off limits’: 
 
You’re not allowed to sort, you’re not allowed to sort of, you don’t write about, 
talk about, subjectivity in terms of marking sets. Well it’s, you daren’t, you don’t, 
because in terms of appeals and things that’s a very dangerous path to even go 
near. (MT) 
 
      Atkinson and Claxton (2000: 37) suggest that ‘unbridled subjectivity’ is seen as 
something to fear, and in keeping with this view the respondents talked about the 
difficulties associated with subjectivity. For example, in the extract below PR talks about 
the centrality of aesthetically informed judgement, but he prefaces this with a sentence 
that suggests that this is a view that may be censored:  
 
However much people are inclined or required to deny it, there is an extent to 
which still in art and design education, perhaps particularly in fine art education, a 
lot of the reality of assessment decisions is located in people’s individual 
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assessor’s versions of what constitutes some kind of aesthetic quality essentially, 
em, that, that’s obviously the first thing that presents difficulties. (PR) 
 
      MT hints that his preferred assessment practices might be disallowed when he 
observes that high-quality student artwork ‘just makes you feel’ (MT); he goes on to 
acknowledge that this definition is a problematic concept for an appeal board. MT 
celebrates an emotional response to student work, but recognizes that there are contexts 
within which this view is not legitimized. In one of the extracts above, DR states that 
‘there is still space for the art kind of feelings’.  He illustrates this point by defending an 
affective response to one student’s show: 
 
We both wept when we saw the work []. When you see that work, you’re very 
moved and it’s very powerful, but how do you measure that kind of intellectually? 
You have to make part of that judgement with your heart if you like, which is 
what art and stuff is about so there clearly is a role for that and maybe you can’t 
write criteria. (DR) 
 
In addition to group-based assessment approaches, the respondents also explored the 
extent to which the use of written learning outcomes and assessment criteria serves to 
promote objectivity. In DR’s words, ‘it’s a subjective thing but it’s grounded in these 
references’ (DR). 
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To conclude this section, subjectivity underpins the lecturers’ assessment practices. This 
subjectivity is best understood as situated within communities of practice. Thus, lecturers, 
to a certain extent, share a common subjectivity (or inter-subjectivity) that is continually 
negotiated, contested, agreed and developed in the context of studio-based group marking 
dialogue.  
 
Discourses of objectivity 
The central position of written learning outcomes in today’s UK educational assessment 
regimes reflects the shift to textual explicitness required by a government emphasis on 
audit and accountability (Orr 2010). Many lecturers introduced learning outcomes in a 
genuine attempt to make assessment practices less mysterious to students; however, 
Blythman and I have argued that the resulting proliferation of paperwork has offered a 
promise of transparency that it fails to deliver (Orr and Blythman 2005). The respondents 
expressed the popular belief that written learning outcomes ‘mitigate the intrusion of 
personal values, feelings and perceptions’ (Leach et al. 2000: 111). Thus, learning 
outcomes appear to promote objectivity and fairness. Ecclestone (2004: 35) notes that 
giving student groups the same learning outcomes offers the illusion that all students are 
on ‘equal footing’ in respect to the manner in which they are assessed. The respondents 
viewed learning outcomes as a means to adjudicate in cases of disagreement: 
 
If we find we’re [] we’re stuck over a student or a particular […] or we’d get 
into arguments and the marks are so varied, we can’t sort of resolve it, we will 
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come back to these, we’ll say ‘hang on, look, does it do this and this and this? 
[points to learning outcomes document]. (MT) 
 
      The written assessment criteria/learning outcomes are reifications that the team can 
‘point to, refer to, strive for, appeal to, and use or misuse in arguments’ (Wenger 2004: 
61). Bell (2000: 3) refers to written criteria in design education as having ‘the status of 
small print on an insurance claim – nobody read it until there’s a dispute and then at least 
we can say the criteria was there’.  
 
      Whilst the written learning outcomes and assessment criteria were viewed as helpful 
anchors, respondents in this study (along with respondents in Hand and Clewes 2000) 
were measured when discussing their usefulness:  
 
You need more than a sentence to be able to extrapolate everything else out of 
that, em, so, em, I think the assessment criterias (sic) are ways into assessing and 
doors into it, em, and I think that, that’s fine, em, and they’re anchors to your 
assessment. But I don’t think, em, you can’t literally interpret those and say, ‘Oh 
there it is there’, and pick it out […]. Sometimes it’s not as simple as that. (LC) 
 
      Returning to the subject of learning outcomes, Shay (2005: 676) argues that they 
allow students and lecturers to collude in ‘the myth of objectivity’.  In a paper entitled 
‘The trouble with learning outcomes’, Hussey and Smith (2002) critique the HE sector’s 
increasing emphasis on the use of learning outcomes. In the field of art education there is 
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further contestation. For Cowdroy and de Graaff (2005: 507), ‘learning outcomes and 
assessment criteria are ambiguous and confound the enhancement of creative ability that 
is the primary purpose of higher education’. Equally, Cannatella (2001: 319) argues 
convincingly that ‘the particular character and activity that goes into the making of art 
does not sit comfortably in any system of general assessment criteria’. 
 
      In earlier research (Orr and Blythman 2005), it has been argued that transparency in 
assessment has become associated with writing things down and giving this information 
to students. MP problematizes this approach:  
 
I think often students are a bit vague about how they’re assessed, even though 
now we [], we thrust lots of bits of paper at them and stuff and handbooks and 
[], and stuff that they, em, yeh, they’re still a bit vague. (MP)  
 
      LP wants the documents he writes to deliver transparency, but acknowledges that this 
is not possible:  
 
I re-wrote the MA because I was so worried that the students didn’t understand 
the process and even though I thought I had made it as clear as a bell [] so I 
mean, so maybe it’s just impossible, but I wanted them to understand. (LP) 
 
      MT, DR and PR point out that many lecturers do not refer to the learning outcomes 
when marking.  In MT’s words: 
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I [have] sat in on moderation meetings in a variety of institutions and what I 
found was that, interestingly for me, what I found was people rarely have that 
[learning outcome document] in front of them. (MT) 
 
      Lecturers relate to the learning outcomes documentation in different ways. For some, 
the documents appeared to lose their own history, and thus their authorship could only be 
inferred. In these cases, the documents were seen as being imposed from the outside. For 
example, BW says that ‘these things will be written down for us in module outline 
forms’.  
 
      Whilst PR was critical of staff who did not bring the written learning outcomes to 
assessment meetings, he partly rejects these documents. He expresses the view that these 
documents are centrally created and do not allow him to mark in the way he wants. This 
corresponds with Entwistle’s (2005) research, which identified that lecturers find learning 
outcomes restrictive. Perceived external authorship can lead to dismissal or rejection, for 
example DR dismisses learning outcomes as the ‘bureaucratic bits’. This would appear to 
support Wenger’s view that a ‘very large portion of the reification involved in work 
practices comes from outside the communities of workers’ (Wenger 2004: 60).  
 
      However, reification is not always imposed; it is also created by the community of 
workers. Therefore, LP, in contrast to PR, talks about writing the learning outcomes, and 
he stresses his agency and sense of authorship. This contrast can be partly explained 
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because the HE validation documents that set out learning outcomes are usually multi-
authored. The documents will be co-written by course leaders, module leaders and quality 
administrators. The lecturers’ sense of authorship in relation to these documents will be 
dependent on institutional approaches, staff positions in the hierarchy and how recently 
the course was written. This can lead to a situation where one lecturer can view these 
documents as externally regulated whilst another may see herself as authoring them.  
 
      The extract below exemplifies the contested nature of authorship and how this relates 
to the lecturers’ relationships to the written assessment documents. BW contrasts the 
language of the documents with the language used amongst the team of assessors:  
 
Well, you see some of those forms we will have written ourselves, but actually 
you kind of, you walk into that situation, don’t you? You can rewrite them and 
then we’ll look at them every now and then but a lot of the time somebody else 
has written that and even if they haven’t, it’s written in a particular kind of 
language which I think we all probably use and then forget about ‘cause it’s kind 
of not that useful […]. We’ll, em, so there are those sorts of things and then we 
might try to describe things using another language that we use amongst 
ourselves. (BW)  
 
Once written, learning outcomes offer a veneer of objectivity. In my analysis, I seek to 
stress that ‘the objective world is itself a construct of the observer’ (Leach et al. 2001: 
296). The written documentation is as much part of the social world as the people 
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authoring it. Learning outcomes and assessment criteria codify cultural and social capital 
just as so-called subjective readings of student work will (Ecclestone 2004).  
 
   The lecturers’ views on the ways they use/ignore the learning outcomes and associated 
documentation offer insight into Bourdieu’s concepts of agency and structure. The 
lecturers’ assessment judgements are not dictated by the written learning outcomes, but 
they are anchored by them. It is the relationship between these documents and the 
lecturers’ assessment experience that enables effective judgement-making.  In the words 
of one lecturer:   
So it’s kind of, in some ways it’s easier, em, and in a lot of ways we do also, 
because of our experience, we kind of try to merge our own experience with the 
objectivity of the criteria. (MP) 
 
Conclusion 
The centrality of dialogic team-based approaches to marking is related to fine art 
pedagogy, with its emphasis on studio-based practice (Orr 2007).  In text-based subjects, 
marking is a more private affair where typically only a small sample of texts will be 
double marked or moderated (Price 2005). My study suggests that opportunities for 
dialogic group-based assessment approaches should be encouraged and supported in 
subjects other than fine art. 
 
This article helps to rehabilitate the concept of connoisseurship by offering a rendering of 
the ways that fine art lecturers move between and across subjective and objective 
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responses when assessing student artwork.  Using Bourdieu’s work as a theoretical tool, I 
have shown an interrelationship and co-dependency between the objective and subjective. 
As DR comments:  
 
The subjective thing is being made by highly trained, educated kind of specialists 
in that subject, so there is a subjective decision being made, but by specialists. 
(DR) 
 
This conceptualization of ‘informed subjects’ (ST) allows us to recognize (and perhaps to 
an extent celebrate) the inter-subjective elements inherent in fine art assessment. Whilst a 
lecturer may offer an apparently individualistic, subjective response to student artwork, 
this response is constructed within a particular social, cultural and political milieu. The 
assessment response is framed/constrained/enabled by the structural and discursive 
setting within which it is made. This is the basis of its objectivity. Individual lecturers’ 
assessment responses are constituted collectively. The key point is that subjective and 
objective responses to students’ artwork are not in opposition to each other. In fine art 
they are both necessary components of an assessment response.  
 
      ST’s reference to the ‘professional subjective response’ unpacks the idea of 
connoisseurship. ST’s words illustrate that the concept of connoisseurship accommodates 
tacit practice because complex informed human judgements cannot be fully explicated in 
language.  As BW points out, ‘it would be very hard for me or anyone else to sit down 
and say, right Susan, now this is how we mark here’ (BW). The respondents’ transcripts 
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revealed the difficulty they experienced when they were asked to render their assessment 
practices in words. Arguably, in HE today, lecturers can be castigated for saying that they 
‘can recognise a first when they see it’. Yet, based on my analysis, this is, to an extent, 
lecturers’ lived experience of making assessment judgements.  
 
      The resonance between this study, which is situated within the discipline of fine art, 
and Shay’s (2005) engineering-based study suggests that my findings may not be 
exclusive to fine art.  Yorke (2008) points out that many disciplines have elements of 
creativity.  This study offers a construction of professional judgement that may have 
applicability in subjects where criteria are ‘fuzzy and fuzzily shared’ (Yorke 2008: 180). 
 
This study offers a rendering of fine art assessment connoisseurship, but it is essential to 
point out that this study does not make an argument for making assessment mysterious, 
unaccountable or elitist. The work of Bloxham and West (2007) and Price et al. (2007) 
shows that it is possible to recognize tacit practice and develop pedagogic approaches 
that support students in making sense of university assessment practices.  
 
      Positioned, perspectival human judgement is central to fine art assessment, but this is 
not the same as saying fine art assessment is whimsical, arbitrary or without rigour. My 
research offers a particular view of rigour as situated within communities of practice. My 
reconceptualized model of rigour derives from the sustained dialogic encounters within 
fine art assessment communities that are contingent on, and positioned within, wider 
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social-cultural contexts. This contrasts with a more positivist view of rigour as being 
solely concerned with validity, reliability and the absence of bias.    
Within this study, rigour is strengthened by the layered, multiple interactions that serve to 
position lecturers, students and their artworks within communities of practice, within the 
discipline, within the academy and within the arts arena. Rigour resides within the shared 
frames of reference in the assessment community that are continually contested and 
(re)constituted through team-based approaches to assessment.  
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